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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Upstream – Federal
D. Colo.
Estate of Simmons v. N.G.L. Holdings, LLC, No 16-cv-02462-RBJ, 2017 WL
6310482 (D. Colo. Dec. 11, 2017).
This case concerns a property dispute wherein Estate claims ownership to a mineral
estate beneath the surface estate owned by Company. The property at issue was
conveyed to Company from Estate, but Estate argues that the mineral and surface
interests were severed and that only the surface interest was conveyed. Company
disputes, claiming that the mineral and surface interests automatically merged into
one ownership interest under Estate and that when the property at issue was
conveyed to Company, both the surface and mineral interests were transferred. On
this, Company moved for summary judgment. The District of Colorado denied
Company’s motion. The court noted that this is a matter of first impression before
the court, the issue being “do mineral and surface estates automatically merge as a
matter of law when they are united ownership?”. Drawing from Colorado law in
the boundary and easement contexts, the court held that, yes, mineral and surface
interests automatically merge when united under common ownership. However, the
court denied Company’s motion because a genuine issue existed as to whether
Estate intended to “re-sever” the mineral estate before conveying the property to
Company.

S.D. Texas
Glassell Non-Operated Interests, Ltd. v. Enerquest Oil & Gas, L.L.C., No. H-161573, 2017 WL 6626652 (S.D. Tex., Dec. 28, 2017).
Developers, individuals, and other entities (collectively, “Developers”) jointly
entered into an Agreement to share in the “royalties, minerals, or other rights in a
40-Square-mile tract” of land. The Agreement included a provision which required
that if any of the Developers acquired the interest held by any other Developer, the
acquiring Developer must share the acquired interest among the rest. One
Developer (“Acquiror”) obtained an interest from two other Developers but refused
to share. First, Acquiror claimed the Agreement exempted it from sharing, but the
court found that because Acquiror did not obtain these new interests before the
agreement was finalized, it must share. Second, Acquiror claims the statute of
frauds bars enforcement of the agreement because its surveyor claimed the relevant
tract was not described “with reasonable certainty.” But, the court concluded that
because Acquiror’s survey was “inadequately precise” and another surveyor came
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to the opposite conclusion, the statute of frauds does not bar enforcement of the
Agreement. Finally, because Acquiror did not partially perform, the Agreement is
enforceable, and it must share in its newly obtained interests. This case has since
been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.

Federal Claims
Waverly View Inv’rs, LLC v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 750 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5,
2018).
Property Owner sued Government, claiming that Government’s operation of
pollution-monitoring wells on Property Owner’s land constituted a physical taking
of Property Owner’s property. Government had originally obtained consent for the
wells based on a right of entry agreement. However, the wells remained after the
right of entry agreement had expired. The court determined that Government’s
continued activities on Property Owner’s land after the right of entry agreement
expired constituted a physical taking. Furthermore, the court stated that Property
Owner was entitled to compensation for each square foot of occupied property.

Upstream – State
Colorado
Stockdale v. Ellsworth, 2017 CO 109.
In 2009, Corporation filed an interpleader action to determine who held rights to
certain oil and gas proceeds and seeking declaratory judgment. It was determined
California Heirs, Kansas Heirs, and two business entities managed by Manger all
had valid claims to the proceeds. The Kansas Heirs and one of Manger’s business
entities withdrew their claims, leaving only the remaining business entity
(“Company”) and the California Heirs. Company claimed that it was entitled to the
proceeds because it had obtained the mineral deeds from the California Heirs; the
California Heirs counter-argued that Company had obtained the deeds through
fraud and deceit. The trial court found that Manager had represented Company in
the dealings and had told the California Heirs that there was no production in the
mineral interest at issue, even though he had already received over $1 million in
proceeds from the lands. The trial court also determined that Company was merely
an alter ego of Manager, and thus pierced the corporate veil, leaving Manager and
Company jointly liable for Corporations’ litigation fees and granted fees and costs.
Manager was subsequently successful in the court of appeals on his argument that
he had not been made a party to the case when he was held liable. However,
Manager’s petition for exemplary damages against the court was denied by the
Supreme Court of Colorado. The court did granted certiorari for Corporation’s writ,
stating that Manager was properly joined in the case. It found that Company was
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simply Manager’s alter ego which pierced the corporate veil, making his joint and
several liability proper, especially since the court found that Manager had adequate
notice and opportunity to contest said decision after the judgment was filed.

Kansas
Adamson v. Drill Baby Drill, LLC, 409 P.3d 874 (Table) (Kan. Ct. App. 2018).
Landowners claimed that Exploration Company’s (“Company”) two oil and gas
leases had terminated for cessation of production in paying quantities. Both
Landowners and Company moved for summary judgment, and the trial court
granted summary judgment to Company for both leases. Landowners appealed and
Company cross-appealed for attorney’s fees. The court of appeals affirmed
summary judgment for several reasons. First, the court held that the lower court
properly determined that Landowners had the burden of proof because the party
claiming cessation of production in paying quantities must present factual evidence
that it has ceased. Second, summary judgement was proper because Landowners
failed to show that there was a cessation of production in paying quantities. Third,
summary judgement was proper because Landowners failed to refute ratification of
one of the leases by the mineral interest owners. Finally, the court remanded
Company’s cross-appeal because the trial court had not ruled on any award for
attorney’s fees.

Louisiana
Briarwood Group, L.L.C. v. Calhoun, 51,732 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/18/18), No.
51,732-CA, 2018 WL 458145.
Landowner conveyed “non-executive mineral rights” to Mineral Owner and later
conveyed an oil and gas lease to Lessee, which was later assigned to Assignee.
Later Mineral Owner transferred interest to Subsequent Mineral Owners, and had
an agreement that Subsequent Mineral Owners and Landowner would each receive
a twenty-five percent royalty, and that Landowner’s royalty and non-executive
right would terminate upon her death. One Subsequent Mineral Owner later sued
Landowner arguing Landowner did not have the right to execute the lease. The
lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Landowner on the basis that
Landowner “signed the [conveyance of mineral rights] in their individual
capacity.” Subsequent Mineral Owners claim it was improper for the lower court to
grant summary judgment “because an issue of material fact exists as to whether
[Landowner] intended convey their individual interests.” Here, the appellate court
agreed with Subsequent Mineral Owners and reversed summary judgment. The
primary reason for this is that intent of the landowner was disputed and, by its
nature, a “determination of intent is not appropriate for summary judgment.” This
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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Maryland
Ellis v. McKenzie, 457 Md. 323 (Md. 2018).
Surface Owners had Mineral Owners mineral interests terminated in January 2013
pursuant to Maryland’s Dormant Mineral Interests Act (“Act”). Mineral Owners
challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The trial court found that the Act was
constitutional and terminated Mineral Owners’ mineral interests; the appellate
court affirmed. Mineral Owners appealed to the additional appellate court. That
court also affirmed, holding that the Notices of Intent were invalid because they
were not filed prior to the Petition for Termination. The court further held that the
Act was not retrospective as to violate Mineral Owners’ due process rights and did
not take property without just compensation.

Oregon
Columbia Pac. Bldg. Trades Council v. City of Portland, 412 P.3d 258 (Or. Ct.
App. 2018).
City appealed a regulatory decision in favor of Interest Group which found that
City’s zoning laws violated the Dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”) of the United
States Constitution as well as several state laws. Generally, the zoning laws restrict
expansion of “Bulk Fossil Fuel Terminals.” The appellate court determined that the
zoning laws were not a violation of DCC because there was not an adequate
showing by Interest Group that there was discrimination between in-state and outof-state business. Specifically, the court noted that the two groups identified by
Interest Group, “in-state purchasers and end users,” could not satisfy the DCC
discrimination requirement because they were not “substantially similar out-ofstate and in-state economic entities.” What’s more, the court determined that any
burden imposed on interstate commerce was not “clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits” here, those benefits include things like protecting health
and public safety. The first state law at issue provides that laws such as the zoning
laws passed by City must have “[A]n adequate factual base” for their conclusions.
The appellate court found it appropriate for the regulatory entity below to
determine that one of the factual bases of the zoning laws lacked “substantial
evidence.” Finally, the zoning laws do comply with state law providing that “A
transportation plan shall . . . facilitate the flow of goods and services. . . .” This is
because there is no dispute that the zoning laws do not “directly alter a
[transportation system plan.]”
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Texas
Bupp v. Bishop, No. 04–16–00827–CV, 2018 WL 280408 (Tex. App. Jan. 3, 2018).
Grantees sued Grantors seeking a declaration that no reservation or exception of
royalty interests had been conveyed by a warranty deed. The trial court determined
that the warranty deed did convey all royalty interests to Grantees and granted
summary judgment in favor of Grantees. Grantors appealed. The court of appeals
reversed for several reasons. First, even though the deed grouped reservations and
exceptions under a singular heading, the four items listed were exceptions to the
conveyance. Second, the fourth exception unambiguously referenced all royalty
interests devised to Grantors by a previous will. Third, the exception prohibited the
deed from passing all of the royalty interest to Grantees because the interests
remained vested in Grantors. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore,
state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Crimson Expl., Inc. v. Magnum Producing L.P., Number 13-15-00013-CV, 2017
WL 6616740 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2017).
Since the early 1990s, Owner has held a mineral interest in an oil and gas lease
(“Lease #1”), which was operated by Operator. In 2006, a trial court deemed Lease
#1 invalid as of year 1996. Before that judgment, Owner and Operator entered into
a Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”) guaranteeing Owner’s interest in the
Lease (after the lease expires) and granting Owner an overriding royalty interest
that could be converted into a working interest. The parties also entered into a letter
agreement (“Letter”) which concerned Owner’s interest in several top leases which
Operator held. In 2006, shortly after the judgment nullifying Lease #1, Operator
changed its records to reflect that Owner in fact did not have any interest in any
well on the acreage. Owner sued for breach of contract and was awarded summary
judgment by the trial court. Operator appealed arguing that the Letter was not
“formal enough” to confer Owner with an interest in the lease. The court disagreed
with Operator and affirmed the trial court. The court held that it is not necessary to
use formal language found in deeds to affect a conveyance of real property and that
the Letter plainly ensured Owner’s interest in current and future top leases.
Similarly, the court held that Letter shows that both parties intended to be bound by
the agreement and thus Operator breached the contract when they stopped paying
working interest to Owner. Finally, the court held that pre-judgment interest was
not due to Owner because Operator reasonably doubted Owner’s title to the
working interest at issue.
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Haywood WI Units, Ltd. v. B&S Dunagan Investments, Ltd., No. 13-15-00454-CV,
2017 WL 6379737 (Tex. App. Dec. 14, 2017).
Royalty Owner sued Lessor claiming that he owned a larger royalty interest than
that which he was being paid and that Lessor was not the holder of the executive
right. The dispositive issue was whether Lessor owned a quarter of the royalty
interest, or less as Royalty Owner claimed. Lessor originally owned a one-half
interest in the mineral estate. The court determined that Lessor owned a quarter
royalty interest even after conveying part of its interest to a third party by deed. The
deed stated that Lessor would “share equally in the mineral lease bonuses, rentals,
royalties or other sums received.” The court held that this language meant that
Lessor retained one half of its original royalty interest, making its current royalty
interest one quarter. The court determined that the second issue did not need to be
decided because Royalty Owner was properly paid his fair share of royalty.

Midstream – Federal
D. District of Columbia
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 280 F.Supp.3d 187
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
Native American Tribe (“Tribe”) brought a claim requesting that the court insure
three specific conditions on an oil pipeline: “(1) the finalization and
implementation of oil-spill response plans at Lake Oahe; (2) completion of thirdparty compliance audit; and (3) public reporting of information regarding pipeline
operations.” The court agreed with these requests, finding them reasonable and
necessary. Accordingly, the court imposed these measure on the Army Corps of
Engineering.

N.D. Ohio
Nexus Gas Transmission, LLC v. City of Green, No. 5:17-2062, 2017 WL 6624511
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 28, 2017).
Company sought to condemn city property to conduct evaluations to properly
install a pipeline. Company brought a motion for partial summary judgment and
motion for preliminary injunction and both were granted by the district court.
Regarding the motion for partial summary judgment, the court analyzed that
Company only holds the “substantive right to condemn” if certain elements are
met. The court determined that Company did meet those elements, finding first that
the project was authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, despite
attempts to challenge the certificate of authorization. Second, the subject land was
indispensable to the project. Lastly, Company did conduct “good faith
negotiations,” to gain access to the property prior to initiating the condemnation,
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and the court also found that it did not need to follow special procedures set out by
state law, even though the public land was held by a municipality, because “the
federal right of condemnation . . . [is] superior” to the state law on such procedure.
The court therefore held that the company had the power to condemn and such
action would cause little harm in this case because the access was for a specific and
narrowly defined section of property, for a specific purpose, and the project was
being carried out for public benefit. Regarding the motion for temporary injunction,
the court held that the request was for only narrowly defined sections of property
directly related to the placement of the pipeline and only to evaluate/survey for
alignment/proper placement of the pipeline and environmental concerns/issues
related to pipeline. Furthermore, even though this is challenged as a “quick take,”
since the court determined that Company has the power of eminent domain, they
should also be granted right to possess immediately. This case has been appealed,
but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal
7th Circuit
Alexander v. Ingram Barge Co., 876 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 2017).
Flood Victims (“Victims”) filed suit against Federal Agency and Company after
Company’s barge broke apart in a storm and damaged a local dam, causing
significant flooding. The district court found that responsibility for the incident
rested solely with Federal Agency, which was exempt from suit under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Victims filed appealed, alleging that Company shared some
of the blame for its negligent actions. Victims’ argument hinged on the assertion
that Company violated three Inland Navigation Rules—Rules 2, 5, and 7. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined the case and held as follows: (1) the
district court made no clear error in its determination that Rule 2 was not violated;
(2) because the findings of the lower court in its examination of whether Rule 5
was violated were supported by the record and not clearly marred by legal error,
the only available conclusion was that the lower court’s reasoning was sound; and
(3) without finding clear error in the lower court’s ruling that the facts did not
establish a violation of Rule 7, it too must be upheld. For those reasons, and
because the district court’s finding that Federal Agency was solely responsible was
also free of any clear error, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling.

D. Colo.
Audubon Soc’y of Greater Denver v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, No. 14-cv02749-PAB, 2017 WL 6334229 (D. Colo. Dec. 12, 2017).
Environmental Organization brought suit against Federal Agency challenging
Federal Agency’s reallocation plan to move water from “flood control to storage
for municipal and industrial use.” Environmental Organization’s complaint
included claims brought under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Operating under a presumption of validity, the
the district court assessed Federal Agency’s action. First, the court held that Federal
Agency had not violated NEPA because: (1) the use of the language that was not
clearly defined did nothing to take away from the objective, reasonable, good faith
showing of the topics that must be addressed under NEPA to allow for public
participation; (2) Federal Agency’s failure to specifically discuss potential changes
to water rights due to its action was not significant enough that it frustrated public
participation by withholding information necessary to have informed participation;
and (3) Federal Agency sufficiently considered the reasonable alternatives put forth
by Environmental Organization. The court then held that Federal Agency’s action
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did not violate the CWA because: (1) the position that “NEPA alternatives” should
have been examined as part of Federal Agency’s CWA analysis was unsupported
by sufficient case law, and thus rejected, and (2) there was no legal or policy reason
to apply the NEPA anti-segmentation rule to the CWA analysis. For those reasons,
the court affirmed Federal Agency’s decision. This case has since been appealed,
but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.

Federal Claims
Welty v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 538 (Fed. Cl. 2017).
Farmer’s land was flooded by water because of a levee on Neighbor’s land that was
constructed voluntarily in conjunction with a federal conservation agency
(“Agency”). Farmer sued Neighbor in 2005 for the damage to the property, but the
suit was dismissed. Farmer then brought suit against Agency for inverse
condemnation without adequate compensation. The trial court found that although
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations could not be granted because Farmer
was on notice of the damage to his land in 2005 and neither Agency nor Neighbor
fraudulently concealed the damage to the property, the stabilization doctrine
applied which allowed Farmer to bring the suit whenever it became clear that
Agency’s actions had amounted to a taking of his property. The court ultimately
dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, however, because Farmer had failed
to show that Agency’s actions were the direct cause of Farmer’s injury. This case
has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.

State
California
Dep’t of Finance v. Comm’n on State Mandates, 18 Cal. App. 5th 661, 226 Cal.
Rptr.3d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2017).
Water Board provided county “and the cities located in the county” (together,
“County”) with a particular permit. Pursuant to issuance of the permit, County had
“to implement various programs to manage [its] urban runoff.” Related to these
requirements, the state constitution requires that the state pay local governments in
certain circumstances. The state, however, is not constitutionally obligated to pay
local government when the regulations imposed by local government are
“mandated by a federal law or regulation.” The court ultimately determined that
this was not a case where regulations were mandated by the federal government
because it only required regulation of “pollutants to the maximum extent
practicable,” and no other specific regulation was required. Accordingly, the case is
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reversed and remanded such that the state is required to reimburse some of the
costs for complying with its requirements.

Idaho
Black Canyon Irrigation Dist. v. State, 408 P.3d 899 (Idaho 2018).
The United States was decreed rights to specific quantities of water in the Cascade
and Deadwood Reservoirs, whose stream flows often exceeded their respective
capacities. On January 31, 2013, the United States filed a Late Claim to assert
“supplemental beneficial use storage water rights” claims against State and Water
Company in the two reservoirs, in which Irrigation District, in response, asserted
that such claims were unnecessary. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Irrigation District but also rejected the assertion that the Late Claims were
unnecessary. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court
decision holding that: (1) the grant of summary judgement against United States
was appropriate because all three requirements of res judicata had been met, thus
barring Irrigation District from attempting to supplement water quantities which
had been previously granted; (2) the special master, who made recommendations in
the lower proceeding, exceeded the district court’s orders of reference by making
an “alternative basis” recommendation because it intruded upon the Director’s duty
of administering water; and (3) because Irrigation District acted in good faith, no
attorney fees were to be granted.
Barnes v. Jackson, 408 P.3d 1266 (Idaho 2018).
Landowner-1 claimed that Landowner-2 and his predecessor in interest had
forfeited the water right to the land in 2014 because it had not been used for over
five years. Landowner-1 alleged that the predecessor to Landowner-2 had not made
beneficial use of the water right for over five years, so it was forfeited before being
purportedly conveyed to Landowner-2. The trial court granted summary judgment
to Landowner-2. The appellate court affirmed, holding that even if Landowner 2’s
predecessor had forfeited his right, the “no control” exception applied to the
predecessor and caused the five-year time period for water right forfeiture to restart
when the predecessor sold the property to Landowner-2 in 2012.

Ohio
Maumee Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Buescher, 3rd Dist. Putnman, No. 12-1706, 2017 WL 6450826 (Dec. 18, 2017).
Water conservation district (“District”), to address its floodplain, appraised and
attempted to purchase acreage from Landowners 1 and 2 to divert water from a
nearby river. Both Landowners refused to sell, so District filed a petition to take the
land by eminent domain. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings to
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District, and Landowners appealed. On appeal, both Landowners claimed that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction because District’s purchase price offer was too
low to be considered realistically, and because District’s petition was not in
accordance with the state’s eminent domain laws. Because District gave both
Landowners thirty-days’ notice of its intent to acquire the property, had given a
written good faith offer to Landowners, and had adequately shown the public need
for the property in its petition, the appellate court affirmed.

Vermont
Transcanada Hydro Ne., Inc. v. Town of Newbury, No. 2016-061, 2017 WL
6210911 (Vt. Dec. 8, 2017).
Company erected a dam and entered into a negotiation with Township for a flow
easement, which is a right to commit trespass in the form of intentional flooding of
land upstream from the dam. In calculating the land affected by this trespass,
Company calculated that 19 acres of land would be directly subject to the flooding
caused by the dam. Township, however, argued that the effects of a dam would
instead affect over 1964 acres. The trial court agreed with Township’s survey,
removed certain land that fell beyond the 100-year flood level, and set the
appropriate amount of acreage covered under the flow easement at 1859 acres. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont agreed with this acreage calculation, and
recognized that every flood has unique peak levels, and that subsequent floods may
continue to add to the cumulative area flooded by the dam. Furthermore, in
determining the price per acre to be paid in the easement, Company calculated the
easements historically paid for the 19 acres of “limited utility” property and argued
that the appropriate price per acre for the easement was $500. Township instead
calculated the median price for flow easements over the much larger 1964 acres
calculated in its initial survey and argued that the appropriate value was $1,100 per
acre. The trial court accepted Township’s method of valuation, but adjusted for a
number of economic factors to arrive at a price of $836 per acre. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Vermont noted that a presumption of validity attached to
Township’s valuation model, and the burden rested on Company to overcome that
presumption. Because Company failed to take into account the proper amount of
acreage affected by the flooding and to price accordingly, they presented no
evidence to rebut the presumption. The Supreme Court of Vermont therefore
affirmed the calculations of the trial court, maintaining the overall value of flow
easements at $1,554,124.
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS
Agricultural Use
Arkansas
VanMatre v. Davenport, 2017 Ark. App. 703, 537 S.W.3d 287.
Landowner-1 purchased land that already had a twenty-five-foot easement which
included a fence originally built to keep cattle off of the land. The fence had been
there for eight years but, according to Landowner-1’s predecessor, its removal
would not negatively affect ingress and egress to the property. The fence was taken
down by Landowner-2 and Landowner-1 sued for an injunction to have the fence
rebuilt and argued that he had been given an exclusive easement by the agreement
with his predecessor. The trial court granted injunctive relief to Landowner-1 and
ordered that Landowner-2 restore the fence. It also found that Landowner-1 had an
exclusive right to the twenty-five-foot easement. The appellate court reversed the
trial court’s finding, holding that there was no exclusive easement given to
Landowner-1. It reasoned that the necessary intent to grant an exclusive easement
to Landowner-1 was impossible to find when examining the four corners of the
original agreement between Landowner-1 and his predecessor. The court remanded
to the trial court on the issue of who was responsible to rebuild the fence.

California
Clews Land & Livestock, LLC v. City of San Diego, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2017).
Landowner sued City after City approved a plan to construct a schoolhouse on
acreage adjoining Landowner’s property used to raise and train horses. Landowner
alleged that City improperly accepted a mitigated negated declaration (“MND”) in
evaluating the environmental impact of the school’s construction rather than an
Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”). The trial court held that Landowner
opposed the project only because it negatively impacted his business economically,
rather than for environmental concerns, and found in favor of City. The appellate
court affirmed the trial court, first noting that Landowner’s claim was disallowed
because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but considered the merits
of the case as well. The court discussed that a MND may be adopted without
demanding an EIR, unless a party challenging a project can show a fair argument
that the project may have a significant effect on the environment. Landowner
argued that the project would create a fire hazard, increase or impede traffic and
transportation, increase noise, reduce recreational activities, and affect historical
resources. However, Landowner offered no evidence as to why the project would
do so, and the court noted that the school’s developers had actually taken concrete
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measures to reduce the risk of these hazards lower than the risk posed before the
project was underway. Therefore, because there was no showing that there were no
significant effects on the environment, adoption of the MND without an EIR was
permissible. Finally, while Landowner argued that the project violated the town’s
“open space” policies, he offered no evidence as to why City’s determination to
adopt the project was unreasonable, which is the burden of proof in challenging an
agency’s interpretation of its own open space policy.

Minnesota
Rosenquist v. Circle K Family Farms, A17-0279, 2017 WL 6418872 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 2017).
Citizen was against a conditional-use permit (“CUP”) application by Farm to build
a hog-confinement facility. Citizen argued that the facility would violate a number
of minimum mandatory requirements set forth in the county zoning ordinance.
Specifically, Citizen was worried the facility would lower property values, create
environmental problems, violate the odor-offset ordinance, and create a nuisance.
The trial court disagreed, finding for Farm. It turned to the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency’s (“MPCA”) analysis of these issues, which found nothing in
Farm’s application that would pose an environmental risk or violate the county
zoning ordinance. The appellate court affirmed the County Board of
Commissioners’ (“Board”) decision, holding that it would be acceptable to grant a
conditional-use permit to Farm so that it could build a hog-confinement facility. It
held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in the granting of Farm’s CUP. This
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.

New Jersey Tax Court
Russo v. Twp. of Plumsted, No. 015983-2012, 2017 WL 6629174 (N.J. Tax Dec.
28, 2017).
Landowner purchased a parcel of land and started farming activities on the land.
The municipal Tax assessor granted farmland assessment for the property in 2000.
That treatment remained in place until 2010. In 2011, Landowner submitted an
application to the assessor for farmland assessment of the property for the 2011 tax
year. Tax Assessor only granted farmland assessment to part of the land because
Landowner was using the land for both farming and non-farming purposes.
Landowner continued to request the same tax assessment the next year. Landowner
filed an appeal of the denial with the County Board of Taxation (“Board”). The Tax
Assessor never visited the property to conduct her assessment of the property;
however, she determined that the dominate use of the land had returned to
agricultural or horticultural use. However, farmland assessment is based on the
active devotion of the property to agricultural or horticultural use for two
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successive years immediately preceding the tax year at issue. The Board issued a
judgment affirming the Tax Assessors decision. Landowner filed a complaint
challenging the judgment. The tax court noted that the statute regarding farmland
assessment required the two years active agricultural or horticultural use before it
may be granted. The court found that although Landowner used the property for
agricultural or horticultural use, he failed to produce evidence establishing the
nature and extent of the use. There is no evidence regarding the number of
livestock or the crops planted or harvested. Because the Landowner failed to meet
the preponderance of evidence requirement that the property was devoted to or
dedicated to agricultural or horticultural use during the 2012 tax year the court up
held the Board’s judgment. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore,
consult state court rules before citing the case as precedent.

Easements
D. New Mexico
Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, CIV 12-0800 RB/JHR, 2017 WL 6512230
(D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2017).
Native American tribe (“Tribe”) sought action against United States under Quiet
Title Act and state common law. Tribe alleges that United States, after purchasing
land in 2000, made attempts to limit members from enforcing their aboriginal title.
Gas Company intervened, asserting its easement rights in relation to a pipeline
which crosses the land in dispute. Gas Company deposed another tribe, (“Tribe-2”)
who has also used the same land for confidential purposes, by written questions to
maintain Tribe-2’s confidentiality. Tribe notified Gas Company that it planned to
attend the next confidential deposition of a third tribe (“Tribe-3”) Gas Company
subsequently moved for a protective order precluding all parties and associated
counsel from attending Tribe-3’s deposition, and Tribe opposed the motion. The
district court granted the Protective Order and denied Tribe’s Motion to Strike,
finding that depositions by written questions are generally not attended by parties,
and even when this is allowed, counsel is unable to interject. Further, Tribe-2’s
deposition cannot be stricken as it is not a pleading.

E.D. Oklahoma
Dobbs v. United States Forest Serv., No. CIV-16-112-RAW, 2017 WL 6598537
(E.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2017).
Landowner owns 160-acre tract of land that is completely surrounded by Upper
Kiamichi Wilderness (“Wilderness”) in Oklahoma. Because the property is
completely surrounded, the only access onto the property is on a foot path.
Landowner filed an application for special access to build a gravel road to his
property. During the pending application, Landowner attempted access on the foot
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path and fell and broke his leg. The United States Forest Service (“USFS”), who
manages the Wilderness, issued an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) denying
Landowner’s request. The Wilderness Act allows for adequate access to private
property that is within the Wilderness. Another Act requires for reasonable
enjoyment of private land within the USFS. Landowner appealed USFS’s final
decision. USFS noted that it did not preclude Landowner from requesting a last
intrusive access to the property. USFS’s EA noted that granting Landowner special
access would go against the USFS’s own interpretation of their regulations. The
district court noted that it must give deference to the USFS interpretation of
regulations. The court concluded that USFS based its decision on an adequate
review of the evidence. It noted that the decision was not arbitrary or an abuse of
district. Therefore, the district court upheld USFS’s decision. This case has since
been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.

Tax Court
Salt Point Timber, LLC v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 633
(Tax 2017).
Company granted a conservation easement to a Conservation Organization and
listed the conservation easement as a charitable deduction its taxes. The IRS denied
the deduction. The tax court determined that the IRS was correct to deny the
deduction for two primary reasons. First, after analyzing the possible outcomes of
what may happen to the conservation easement, the tax court determined that the
easement could end up in the hands of an entity that is not considered a “qualified
organization” as defined by the relevant tax regulation. Second, Company failed to
adequately demonstrate that even if it were possible that the conservation easement
was to end up in the hands of an entity that was not a “qualified organization,” that
such a “possibility that the easement will be replaced is negligible.”

Alaska
Reeves v. Godspeed Props., LLC, Nos. S-15461/15482, 2018 WL 561386 (Alaska
Jan 26, 2018).
Landowner 1 sued Landowner 2 over the validity of an appurtenant easement
allegedly created by deed. Landowner 1 argues that one of the words in the deed is
not actually a word and, therefore, the deed is ambiguous. The Supreme Court of
Alaska said, however, that although the language Landowner 1 refers to is akin to a
spelling mistake, such mistakes are not dispositive. Further, the use of that word
only had “one reasonable interpretation.” The court also considered what kind of
easement was created by the deed. Here, because that determination was
ambiguous, the court analyzed “the facts and circumstances surrounding the
conveyance.” On this issue, the court deferred to the lower court’s determination
that because the way the easement existed, it “clearly created a servient estate [] in
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favor of a dominant estate.” Therefore, the court said, an appurtenant easement was
created. Next, the court determined that it was error for the lower court to
determine “that the entire easement was terminated by prescription.” Instead, the
court determined that only part of the easement was terminated. Part of the
easement was extinguished because a gold plant on part of the properties in dispute
was determined to be “a permanent improvement,” and it was not clear error for the
lower court to determine that. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.

California
Jaffe v. Bradshaw, D069824, 2017 WL 6505782 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2017).
Landowner owns land immediately above the lot that Neighbor owns. Landowner
bought the property in 1982 and maintains and harvests a part-time commercial
enterprise. Neighbor bought his land in 2009 and does not live at the home full
time. The only vehicle access to Neighbor’s property is a road that runs alongside
the edge of Landowners property. Neighbor has an easement to use the roadway set
forth in the legal description of Neighbor’s property. After Neighbor purchased the
property, he started making improvement to the easement of the road by widening
the road and providing a turnabout. The improvements caused problems to
Landowner’s property. Neighbor had installed a pipe adjacent to Landowner’s
property when it was owned by the previous land owner. Neighbor brought a cause
of action to which Landowner brought a cross claim. The trial court found that
Neighbor failed to meet the burden of proof about his claims of public nuisance,
negligence, and private nuisance. The trial court granted Landowner’s request for
declaratory relief concerning Neighbor’s temporary parking easement road because
it found that as a matter of law, this request to prevent Neighbor from parking on
the easement because the act is a means to interfere with Landowner’s reasonable
use of the property. The trial court also found that the injunction will cause no harm
to Neighbor. The trial court also found that it was not illegal for Land Owner to put
in the pipe. The appellate court affirmed the lower court finding that Neighbor’s
arguments failed because of the factual premise. This is an unpublished opinion of
the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
McBride v. Smith, A147931, 227 Cal. Rptr.3 d 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
This dispute between adjacent landowners involved an easement allowing the use
of a shared driveway for secondary ingress and egress or emergency access.
Landowner-2’s complaint alleged that Landowner-1 installed fixtures on the
easement area that prevented Landowner-2 from using the driveway as pursuant to
the easement terms and the longtime use as primary access by herself and her
predecessors. Landowner-2 claims that she had been using the easement for
primary access openly for years and so had a prescriptive easement for primary

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

1538

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

access. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded for
several reasons. First, the court held that Landowner-2 did not have enough
supporting evidence to show that Landowner-2 had committed a nuisance,
effectively depriving Landowner-2 of access to and enjoyment of her property.
Landowner-2 only introduced facts that showed that her access to the easement for
secondary access was compromised, not that she could not access the property that
she actually owned. However, second, the court held that Landowner-2 presented
enough support for a claim for a prescriptive easement, since she claimed that her
use had been open, known and on a “daily basis” for years, which is a dramatic
deviation from the original terms of the easement. The court held that she had a
nuisance claim but did not adequately state how the installed poles and chains
disturbed or prohibited her use of her property right in the secondary access
easement. However, the court held that she did have a “claim as a matter of law”
because the facts presented support a claim for prescriptive easement. Therefore,
the court reversed and remanded the case to the lower court for resolution in
accordance with the appeal court’s opinion.

Colorado
City of Lakewood v. Armstrong, 2017 COA 159.
In 1984, a prior landowner granted a permanent public easement to County who
then deeded the same to City. In 2011, the current landowners (“Landowners”)
bought the land subject to the easement and attempted to prevent access to the
easement by locking a gate to its entrance. In 2015, City sought to quiet title and
sought other remedial measures. Landowners counterclaimed, arguing that the
easement was invalid. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court
determined that the easement was valid and entered summary judgment in favor of
City. The appellate court affirmed, founding that the easement was validly
conveyed and that the lack of express description of the dominant estate and the
lack express notice did not invalidate the easement. The court determined that
easements are reasonably certain and valid when they provide “in accurate detail,
the size, dimensions, type of use, and location of the easement on the servient
tenement, as well as the precise legal description of the servient property.” It
further noted that an easement recorded in the County Clerk’s Office is sufficient to
amount to constructive notice.

Florida
Goldman v. Lustig, No. 4D16-1933, 2018 WL 527011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 24,
2018).
Landowners filed an action seeking to declare their right to use a portion of a dock
on Waterfront Landowner’s property. Landowners also sought an injunction
against Waterfront Landowner disallowing any prohibition against using the dock.
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The community in which Landowners and Waterfront Landowner lived established
a homeowner’s association. The homeowner’s association formed an Agreement
with Waterfront Landowner that severed all riparian rights of a portion of the dock
that was located on Waterfront Landowner’s property. Landowners argued that
they had the right to use the dock pursuant to the Agreement and an easement by
necessity. The court held that Landowners had a right to the portion of the dock
that was expressed in the Agreement. The court concluded that Waterfront
Landowner waived any arguments against the Agreement when he conceded at trial
that he only owned and had rights to a certain portion of the dock. The court also
held that Landowners were not entitled to an easement by necessity of Waterfront
Landowner’s property, concluding that, because the Landowners also lived off
waterfront property and could construct a pier to allow access to the dock from
their own properties, it was not an absolute necessity for Landowners to use
Waterfront Landowner’s property to get to the dock.

Illinois
Rainbow Council of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Holm, 2018 IL App (3d) 160715.
A Boy Scouts of America Troop (“Troop”) filed a temporary restraining order
against Landowner for the use of a path adjacent to property Troop used for its
scouting activities. Landowner argued that Troop could access the property without
use of the path by driving six or seven miles, and that Troop was trespassing on his
property when using the path. The trial court granted the injunction, reasoning that
Troop had a prescriptive easement to use the path to access the property. It noted
that to restrict such use would cause an irreparable injury to Troop. Landowner
appealed, and the appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings. Landowner
argued that Troop brought suit with unclean hands, but the court found that Troop
was guilty of no misconduct, fraud, or bad faith, and that it had made reasonable
efforts to prevent its invitees from accidentally trespassing Landowner’s driveway.
It further held that there was no reasonable alternative for Troop to access its
property and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
injunction.

Kentucky
Ellington v. Becraft, 534 S.W.3d 785 (Ky. 2017).
Individual sued for a declaratory judgment against Property Owner asking that a
passway be recognized as a public road. The district court entered judgment for
Individual, holding that the road was a public passway and that Individual had
obtained an easement by prescription. The appellate court reversed and Individual
appealed to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed in part
and reversed in part, holding that evidence was insufficient to prove that the road
was entirely public, but that the portion which passed over the Individual’s
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property was public. The court also abrogated a prior decision relevant to the legal
issues presented, that “proof of county control for any period of time is not
necessary to establish a common law public road.” Lastly, the court held that six
years of non-use was insufficient to evidence abandonment of an easement. 3

Massachusetts
Nicoli v. Gooby Indus. Corp., 16-P-1652, 2017 WL 6390941 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec.
15, 2017).
Servient Landowners filed an action to enforce a contract between Servient
Landowners and Dominant Landowner. The contract provided that Servient
Landowner would convey an easement to Dominant Landowner to allow Dominant
Landowner to erect a retaining wall of the edge of Servient Landowners’ property.
In return, Servient Landowners could purchase a piece of land from Dominant
Landowner. Dominant Landowner argued that the agreement was unenforceable
because it did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds and the terms were too indefinite.
The court held that the agreement had been taken outside of the Statute of Frauds
because Servient Landowners completely fulfilled their obligations. Additionally,
Servient Landowners were free from the restraints and penalties of the Statute of
Frauds because they substantially relied on Dominant Landowner’s promise to
convey the piece of land to Servient Landowners. The court also held that the
agreement was definite enough to be enforced. The court concluded that when
looking at the agreement and taking into account the intention of the parties, the
agreement terms could be construed and ascertained with reasonable certainty. This
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the opinion as precedent.

Michigan
In re Joseph M. Drago Revocable Tr. Agreement Dated Aug. 11, 1992, No.
335472, 2018 WL 442219 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2018).
The trial court denied Landowner’s request to remove a dock at the end of a private
road. Landowner appealed, arguing that Lot Owners were “riparian” owners who
only had a right to build and maintain a dock at water’s edge. The appellate court
held that the caselaw did not limit private access to water’s edge, but rather
indicates an intent to allow access into bodies of water. Landowner also argued that
by allowing overnight mooring of boats, the trial court erred because this would
constitute unlimited use of the dock, but the appellate court held that the trial court
never stated that “temporary mooring” included overnight mooring. As to all of
Landowner’s arguments, because the trial court was not clearly erroneous in its
interpretation of the caselaw, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted
before citing the case as precedent.
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Montana
Hudson v. Irwin, 2018 MT 8, 390 Mont. 138, 408 P.3d 1283.
Landowner-1 sued neighboring Landowner-2 for declaratory relief, arguing that
Landowner-1 was entitled to use an airstrip located on Landowner-2’s property
pursuant to a prior easement grant. The trial court concluded that Landowner-1’s
property was not benefitted by an easement to use the airstrip because there was no
express reservation of the easement in the prior agreement. The Supreme Court of
Montana affirmed the decision of the lower court but for alternative reasons. The
court held that Landowner-1 did not have an easement because the agreement only
allowed for the use of one airplane on the airstrip, and to allow for another
landowner to use the airstrip would permit more than one airplane to use the
airstrip, thus violating the agreement.

Nebraska
Royal v. McKee, 905 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 2017).
Property Owner sued Utility District, contending that he should be given fee title
ownership of a 200-foot right-of-way that went across Property Owner’s property.
Utility District then filed a counterclaim, arguing that it had acquired ownership via
adverse possession. Although the trial court held that Utility District had acquired
an easement in the right-of-way through its predecessor’s eminent domain in 1869,
the court ultimately ruled that neither Property Owner nor Utility District had
established the elements of adverse possession necessary to quiet title. The court
ruled against Utility District’s adverse possession claim because its use of the rightof-way was not hostile. Giving deference to the lower court’s holding, the court
ruled against Property Owner’s adverse possession claim because Property Owner
did not establish the claim in his amended complaint. Because the court found that
neither party had established adverse possession over the right-of-way, the court
vacated the trial court’s default against all parties other than Utility District and
Property Owner.

New Jersey
Xiaofei Wang v. Mei-Yu Tsai, No. A-0171-16T3, 2018 WL 389185 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Jan. 12, 2018).
Landowner and Neighbor owned adjoining properties that were once a part of a
larger parcel of land. At some point, the land split, and the previous owner sold the
parcel of land now owned by Neighbor, reserving for themselves the other half of
the land and a strip of land in between to operate as a right of way, which is now
owned by Landowner. The right of way appeared in all subsequent deeds.
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Landowner erected a fence down the middle of the right of way, and Neighbor
made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to remove the fence. Neighbor sued for a
declaratory judgement to declare the continued existence of the right of way and
sought an order to require Landowner to remove fence. The lower court ruled for
Neighbor, finding that there was no evidence that the interest in the right of way
had ever been abandoned and that the easement was “available as a general way.”
On appeal, appellate court affirmed the lower court and held that Neighbor was the
dominant tenement, and that Landowner did not meet its burden of proof to support
a finding of abandonment. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore,
state court rules should be consulted before citing to the case as precedent.

New York
Maicus v. Maicus, 156 A.D.3d 1019 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Landowner-1 appealed a trial court’s order which determined that adjoining
Landowner-2 possessed a right-of-way to two dirt roads located on Landowner-1’s
property. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, reasoning that the deeds
used by Landowner-1 to show a chain of title provided Landowner-1 with actual
notice that a right-of-way had been reserved by prior landowners. The actual notice
was evidenced by the language in a deed which reserved access to the two dirt
roads to “the remaining property owned by” the preceding landowners to
Landowner-2’s property.
Patel v. Garden Homes Mgmt. Corp., 68 N.Y.S.3d 87 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Landowners’ property was encroached upon by runoff water from Corporation’s
land, so Landowners sued for trespass to recover damages and an injunction.
Corporation countered that it had acquired a proscriptive easement over
Landowners’ property. The trial court rendered judgment for Corporation, finding
that Corporation had an easement that precluded Landowners’ cause of action. The
appellate court reversed and remanded because: (1) Corporation’s use of
Landowners’ property was not proven to be continuous by clear and convincing
evidence and therefore it had no proscriptive easement, and (2) the trespass to
Landowners’ property was continuous so their action was not time-barred.

North Carolina
Turnage v. Cunningham, 808 S.E.2d 619 (Table) (N.C. Ct. App. 2018).
Landowners owned a landlocked tract, so they filed for an easement by necessity
through Neighbors’ property. The predecessors in interest to Landowners filed a
Petition for Cartway through Neighbors’ land, which was denied. Landowners won
the easement at trial on a summary judgment motion, so Neighbors argued on
appeal that any implied easement that Landowners’ predecessors in title acquired
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had been abandoned long since and any implied easement owned by Landowners’
or their predecessors had been adversely possessed by Neighbors. The appellate
court affirmed because no easement was abandoned because it was only recently
granted and no easement could have been adversely possessed for the same reason.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.

Ohio
Blanton v. Eskridge, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3783, 2017 WL 6371730 (Dec.

11, 2017).
Landowner lived on land that had been landlocked since 1962. The state had built a
limited access entrance to Landowner’s land from State Route 52 across the land
eventually owned by Neighbor. Landowner had lived on the land for less than a
year when he received a cease and desist letter from Neighbor concerning his use
of the private roadway. Landowner filed a complaint claiming both a prescriptive
and a necessity easement. After the trial, Landowner dropped his prescriptive
easement claim and proceeded with only the necessity easement claim; the trial
court ruled in favor of Landowner. Neighbor appealed. The appellate court
determined that “[p]rior unity of ownership of both the dominant and servient
estate [was] the sine qua non for establishing an easement by necessity.” The court
noted that Landowner never established such prior unity of title and also failed to
prove that his land was landlocked when originally subdivided. Because
Landowner did not meet the requirements for an easement by necessity, the court
reversed the lower court’s decision.
Bd. of Dirs., Maumee Watershed Conservancy Dist. v. Army, 3rd Dist. Van Wert
NO. 15-17-09, 2017 WL 6450822 (Dec. 18, 2017).
Water conservation district (“District”) obtained land right easement from
Landowners in 1994. District learned in 2012 that Landowners had sold the
property to Trustees, who had plans to develop the property subject to the
easement. In 2016, District was made aware that Trustees had cut down trees and
drained a pond, exceeding the limits placed upon the property by the easement.
District brought action against Trustees, and the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of District. On appeal, Trustees asserted that trial court erred in
granting summary judgment, but the appellate court held that summary judgment
was appropriate because no genuine issue of fact existed as to the issues of the
permanent injunction, damages, and imposed fine. Additionally, the court found
that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its denial of Trustees
counterclaim and request for continuance. Accordingly, the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

1544

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

City of Sidney v. Spring Creek Corp., 3rd Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-07, 2017 WL
5989073 (Dec. 4 2017).
Corporation appealed lower court’s decision granting summary judgment for City
in a dispute regarding control over an aquifer below Corporation’s property.
Corporation was landowner of the two subject parcels, holding a conservation
easement for use of the water from the aquifer below said parcels. The conservation
easement was only in place after negotiations for the sale of the property from
Corporation to City fell through. Afterward, City sought fee simple title to the
subject property and the related groundwater from the underlying aquifer below.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in favor of the City because it
determined that the easement in question could not be considered a conservation
easement, despite the Tribe’s assertion. This is because the easement language did
not reflect an effort to preserve the land from physical change or development.
Instead, although the underlying aquifer was meant to remain intact, by the
easement terms the surface land is allowed and intended to be drastically altered.
Furthermore, the court agreed with City’s finding that the conservation easement
went against public policy and state law. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower
court’s decision in favor of City.

Pennsylvania
Bartkowski v. Ramondo, Nos. 432 EDA 2017, 521 EDA 2017, 2018 WL 495213
(Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2018).
Servient Owner had constructed a driveway with the permission of the previous
dominant property’s owner to access its own property. Dominant Owner sued
Servient Owner for trespass and ejectment after Dominant Owner acquired the
property. Servient Owner argued that it had either acquired the property underlying
the driveway via adverse possession or that it had an easement by either
prescription, necessity, or implication. The trial court found that the Servient
Owner had an easement by prescription and dismissed the other claims. Dominant
Owner appealed. Additionally, Servient Owner challenged the trial court’s lack of
finding of an easement by necessity and its failure to grant Servient Owner title to
the driveway’s land under the doctrine of consentable line. On appeal, the court
found that the trial court erred by finding that the Servient Owner had a prescriptive
easement because the trial court incorrectly determined that there was unity of
ownership before separation of the parcels creating the basis for the easement.
However, the court agreed with the trial court in finding there was no easement by
necessity because difficulty and expense did not equate with impossibility. Lastly,
in dealing with the issue of the doctrine of consentable line, the court affirmed the
trial court’s finding to not grant the Servient Owner the property underlying the
driveway, holding the driveway was not running along a boundary of the properties
but was fully within the Dominant Owner’s property. This is an unpublished
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opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be followed before citing
the case as precedent.
Imhoff v. Deemer, No. 303 WDA, 2017, WL 6330801 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 12,
2017).
Landowner and Neighbor own adjacent properties. Neighbor obtained a building
permit to construct a barn on their property. They also obtained permits to construct
a riding area for their horses. A year later, heavy rainfall came that caused huge
amounts of water, soil, and debris to flow from Neighbor’s property onto
Landowner’s. Neighbor constructed a split fence along the property line.
Landowner filed a complaint alleging private nuisance. At a bench trial, the trial
court issued an order in favor of Neighbor. Landowner applied arguing that the
barn and riding area needed to be set back 150 feet because they were “structures
for animal raising and care.” The appellate court found that Landowner failed to
prove that Neighbor lacked in meeting the 150-foot requirement. This was because
Landowner did not provide evidence of how the fixtures failed to be 150 feet away
from the property line. The court also rejected the issue of Landowner’s claiming
that Neighbor had a responsibility regarding the heavy rainfall causing debris to
come on Landowner’s land. The court noted that owners do become liable for
damage that is caused by natural discharge when they alter the natural conditions to
change the flow of the water. In this case, Landowner’s actions were not enough to
constitute an alteration that changed where the water flowed. Therefore, the court
upheld the trial courts order in favor of Neighbor. This is an unpublished opinion of
the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Plows v. Roles, No. 631 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 494775 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 22,
2018).
Landowner-1 appealed a trial court’s judgment that granted Landowner-2 the right
to install a sewage line through Landowner-1’s property. The court affirmed the
decision of the lower court, reasoning that the use of the easement listed in
Landowner-1’s deed provided Landowner-2 with the right to construct a sewage
line through Landowner-1’s property. Further, the court reasoned that there were
no limitations on the ability of Landowner-2 to use the easement for ingress or
egress; thus, the installation of a sewer line would be proper to make Landowner2’s property livable. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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Thomas A. Robinson Family Ltd. P’ship v. Bioni, 178 A. 3d. 839 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017).
Company sued Landowner after Landowner installed a large steel post on his
sidewalk that prevented Company from accessing public roads with its large paving
vehicles. Company claimed that through years of continuous use by itself and its
predecessor, they had a prescriptive use to the two feet of “sidewalk” that ran
across Landowner’s property. Trial court found in favor of Company and that both
Company and the public had a prescriptive easement to the sidewalk. The appellate
court affirmed that Company had met the twenty-one-year continuous and
uninterrupted use element of a prescriptive easement. Although Company had only
been in business for twenty years at the time of the lawsuit, the use of Company’s
predecessors of the easement was sufficient to meet the twenty-one-year
requirement. However, the court vacated the portion of the trial court’s finding that
the general public has the right to traverse Landowner’s property. No claim to a
public prescriptive easement was made in this case, no claim was made to the
public easement at trial, and Company did not argue in defense of a public
easement on appeal.

Texas
Bujnoch v. Copano Energy, LLC, No. 13-15-00621-CV, 2017 WL 6616741 (Tex.
Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2017).
Landowner gave Energy Company a thirty-foot wide easement for the construction
and maintenance of a pipeline. Subsequently, Energy Company approached
Landowner again asking for another easement for a second gas line, which
Landowner granted. Energy Company’s attorney then sent e-mails to Landowner
stating that Energy Company would pay $70 per foot of the pipeline, to which
Landowner agreed. However, Landowner later received written letters from a
different Energy Company representative stating that it would only be paying $20
to $40 per foot of the second pipeline. Landowner then brought a breach of contract
claim and a tortious interference claim against Energy Company. The trial court
found in favor of Energy Company and granted summary judgment on both the
breach of contract claim and the tortious interference claim. The appellate court
reversed the trial court’s findings on the breach of contract claim, holding instead
in favor of Landowner. It reasoned that there was a breach of contract because the
emails sent to Landowner included essential terms and could be read together so as
to satisfy the statute of frauds. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
summary judgment in favor of Energy Company on the tortious interference claim.
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Utah
Hall v. Peterson, 2017 UT App 226, 409 P.3d 133.
Landowner denied Neighbor access to a dirt road Neighbor claimed to be the only
way to access another road leading to Neighbors land. Neighbor sued, arguing that
an easement by estoppel was created on the dirt road, and thus, he was entitled to
use of the road. A jury found sufficient evidence to support an easement by
estoppel. Landowner appealed, arguing that there was not enough evidence to
support a finding of an easement, and thus, the trial court erred when it denied
Landowner’s motion for a directed verdict. appellate court held that because
easement by estoppel has never been recognized by the state, the elements under
the restatement definition, which requires: (1) permission to use, (2) reasonable
foreseeability of reliance by user, and (3) a substantial change of position by user
and these elements, were questions of fact for the jury. It further held that the
evidence was not sufficient to prove estoppel because there was no evidence that
the dirt road was ever used by a predecessor in title and, regardless, it was not
pervasive enough to give notice to Landowner. Thus, the court found that it was not
reasonable to deduce reliance from Landowner’s silence to Neighbor’s use of the
dirt road and that Neighbor failed to provide any evidence of actual reliance.
Because Neighbor failed to meet all the requirements of easement by estoppel, the
appellate court reversed the jury finding of the lower court and remanded the case.
Wisconsin
Campbell v. Vill. of DeForest, No. 2017AP601, 2017 WL 6398534 (Wis. Ct. App.
Dec. 14, 2017).
Property Owner (“Owner”) purchased certain property in 1999. Owner knew that
the property was burdened by a public pedestrian and bicycle easement, which was
subject to both use by the general public of the Village and to management and
improvement by the Village itself. In 2015, the Village constructed a raised
boardwalk within the easement for the use of walkers and cyclists. Owner filed a
petition for inverse condemnation seeking compensation for loss of ability to use
the part of her land that was subject to the easement. The court agreed that the
boardwalk created a barrier preventing her use; however, it also determined that the
Village’s design of the boardwalk was fully within its broad rights under the
easement’s language and concluded that no taking occurred. Thus, Owner’s claim
was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed. The court
echoed the sentiment of the lower court, stating that the easement agreement was
very broad, and that the Village did not exceed the thirty feet allowed for the
easement. The court also noted that the point of an easement is that the “[Owner’s]
right to freely use her property must succumb to the Village’s use and enjoyment of
the easement.” This is an unpublished opinion; therefore; state court rules should
be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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Fankhauser v. Fankhauser, No. 2017AP776, 2018 WL 565854 (Wis. Ct. App.
January 25, 2018).
Landowner sued Neighbor after Neighbor obstructed Landowner’s access to his
property by blocking an easement. Landowner argued that the parties had
negotiated an end to the lawsuit, but Neighbor refused to sign two documents
necessary to complete the agreement. Landowner argued that the negotiations
constituted a binding settlement agreement. Trial court held that the parties had
reached an “agreement in principle” and that the terms were therefore enforceable.
On appeal, the court adopted the “formal contract doctrine” under Wisconsin law,
in which where parties negotiate and contemplate signed documents as necessary to
complete the agreement, the parties are only bound by those documents if they are
signed. The court also noted that because the negotiations included the conveyance
of an easement that was required to be recorded with the County Register of Deeds;
one of the formal requirements under State law for a conveyance is that the
instrument is to be signed by both parties. This was further evidence that the parties
intended the affidavit to be in writing. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court,
and concluded that no binding agreement existed between the two parties. This is
an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted
before citing the case as precedent.

Other Land Issues
Fifth Circuit
Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. City of Peoria, 880 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2017).
Company signed a lease with City allowing Company to collect gasses emanating
from City’s landfill to be converted into electricity. A provision in the lease stated
that upon termination of the contract, City had the right to “retain all ‘structures’
and ‘below-grade installations and/or improvements.’” Eventually, the lease was
terminated and City kept the property. Later, though, Company filed for bankruptcy
and refinanced in such a way that creditor claimed a lien on the property in dispute.
Creditor then sued City, claiming a right to the property in dispute because of its
lien after Company defaulted on their agreement with creditor. The lower court,
however, found that City’s claim to the property in dispute should prevail because
Creditor “could not have obtained any rights greater than those held by [Company]
even with” its interest acquired through bankruptcy. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court, finding that City’s claim to the property should
prevail because termination of the contract gave it such a right.
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9th Circuit
Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio, 876 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir 2017).
The United States’ Forest Service (“USFS”) restricted certain land near the Grand
Canyon from mining practices, but this restriction did not apply to existing mining
rights of Companies. USFS determined that Companies had a preexisting right to
mine, so were not prevented by the land designation. The court held that USFS’s
action was final because it was a “practical requirement” for continued mining by
Companies, and they were aware of its importance. Additionally, the court held
that the lower court was correct in its unfavorable determination of the merits of
Tribe’s claim for several reasons. First, the court held that the Mineral Report
issued was a federal action, and no further environmental impact studies were
required under NEPA because this decision was a follow-up to a temporary halt in
a previously approved operation, so no changes to the operations were intended.
Second, the Mineral Report was found to be an “undertaking” under NHPA only to
the extent that it “acknowledged the continued vitality of the original approval” for
mining. Therefore, the court found that no other evaluation was needed for this
acknowledgement. Information on the property’s historic preservation status was
not introduced by the earlier approval because it was not yet applicable for this
property, and Tribe asserted that such information should have been introduced
later, when it was available. However, the court held that this requirement was
eliminated by a revision to the pertinent statute. Therefore, no “continuing
obligation” to reevaluate later in the process was no longer imposed. The court also
held that Tribe asked for more stringent evaluation and remedies than could legally
be provided by the NHPA and that the legislation that was the basis for Tribe’s
claims was not in place to protect private property interests, so Tribe had no
standing to bring such a claim for violation.

Massachusetts
Gentili v. Town of Sturbridge, 15 MISC 000570, 2018 WL 446353 (Mass. Land Ct.
Jan. 10, 2018).
The facts of this case took place over a period of over sixty years. About twenty
years before Trust brought this action against Town, Trust decided it wanted to
make adjustments to a property road. It observed nearby drainage structures so it
asked the town conservation commission (“Commission”) if the road was subject
to state wetlands regulation. Commission told Trust it was not, but then six years
later Commission said it found a clearly observable stream running across the
property and forming a wetland. Any developments Trust made would thus be
subject to the state’s wetlands regulatory act. Trust brought an action against Town
for discharging stormwater onto its property. It argued that Town had no
prescriptive easement or other right to discharge water onto its property, which
discharge was creating the wetlands. The court held that decades before Trust
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brought this action, Town had already acquired the right to discharge stormwater
onto Trust’s property because it was collecting and discharging surface water
continuously, openly and adversely under a claim of right, on Trust’s property, for
more than twenty years. Town satisfied the requirements to gain a right or
easement by prescription and Trust’s claims against it were dismissed.

Nebraska
Cappel v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 905 N.W.2d 38 (Neb. 2017).
Property Owners sued the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) for
claims of inverse condemnation, public health and welfare, due process, and
restitution. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Property Owners
had failed to state a claim on the count of inverse condemnation. Property Owners
appealed. The Nebraska Supreme Court first held that Property Owners’ public
health and welfare claims should have been barred for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the claims were being made against a state, which held
sovereign immunity against them. The court then found that the district court
correctly determined that Property Owners had failed to articulate a compensable
private property right in their claim for inverse condemnation, because the relevant
authority holds that water is a public resource, and the manner in which DNR
regulated it did not constitute a physical or regulatory taking required for a
compensable claim of inverse condemnation. Finally, the court held that Property
Owners’ final two claims must also be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because: (1) due process violations fail to create independent causes of
action seeking monetary damages, meaning Property Owners’ sole remedy was the
public health and welfare claims already discussed, and (2) Property Owners did
not follow either of the procedures that the Nebraska legislature has provided to
allow suits for restitution against the state, so sovereign immunity still applied.
Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Property Owners’
inverse condemnation claim and remanded the issue with instructions for the lower
court to dismiss the remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

New York
Matter of City of N.Y., (CY) 4018/07, 2018 WL 413750 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12,
2018).
In this condemnation proceeding, the court analyzed the compensation owed to
Landowner for the property taking done by City. The property was regulated as
wetlands, so development was unlikely, if not impossible. Landowner had
purchased the already wetland designated property at a foreclosure sale. The main
issue was calculating the value of the property. Typically, wetland properties are
valued based upon their use as restricted by the regulation. However, there is an
exception if Landowner establishes that the regulation on the property is a
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regulatory taking. If Landowner establishes the regulation as a taking, the property
value calculation would be based upon the current value of the property as
regulated plus an added amount that a subsequent purchaser may pay for the
property for the possibility of successful litigation to deregulate the property. The
court first determined whether the fact that Landowner purchased the property after
the wetland regulation precluded him from challenging the wetland regulations and
found that it did not. The court then determined whether a successful challenge to
the wetland regulations on the property could be undertaken to warrant an increase
in the value of the property. The court first concluded that the regulations deemed
the property useless for economic reasons and removed all but a minor residual
value for the property. Therefore, the court assigned a value to the property with
the added value of potential successful deregulation. This amount was established
by experts and analysis by the court through reviewing what amount of the
difference of the unregulated value of the property, minus costs for deregulation
litigation, and regulated value of the property should be added to the condemnation
value.
Troy Sand & Gravel Co. v. Fleming, 156 A.D.3d 1295 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Operator applied to the Department of Environmental Conservation for a mining
permit to operate an open pit, hard rock quarry. Operator’s plans for the land,
which was located within a rural residential area, required the blasting of solid rock
formations. Commercial excavation was permitted in this district subject to the
procurement of a special use permit; the Town Board (“Board”) denied Operator’s
application for the permit. Operator brought suit seeking to annul the Board’s
denial. First, Operator argued that the Board violated an agreement between the
parties to review the application under a local law, which required a special use
permit application be subject to a public hearing. Operator claimed the Board
violated this agreement when it held its own public hearing separate from the initial
hearing and it accepted additional environmental information beyond the initial
Environment Impact Statement (“EIS”). Operator further claimed that the Board’s
decision was arbitrary and capricious because it did not rely on the EIS. The court
held that the deviations from the agreement did not violate any local law, nor did
such deviations violate the agreement itself. The court further held that Board’s
denial of Operator’s permit application “properly found its rationale in the EIC.”
Finally, the court rejected Operator’s contention that the Board’s decision was an
error due to conflicts of interest and bias of members of the Board, holding that
these claims of conflict and bias lacked merit. For these reasons, the New York
Supreme Court affirmed Board’s denial of Operator’s application for a special use
permit.
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North Carolina
Little River, LLC v. Lee Cty., 809 S.E.2d 42 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
Miner applied for a special use permit to develop an aggregate rock quarry in an
area zoned primarily for residential agriculture but that allowed quarry
development. After multiple public hearings, County denied Miner a special use
permit, claiming Miner failed to meet the permit requirements, namely, that the
quarry would not adversely affect public health, safety, and neighboring property
values, that all conditions of the permit were met, and that the quarry could be
developed in harmony with the surrounded area. Miner appealed County’s decision
to the court which upheld County’s denial. Miner then appealed the lower court’s
decision. The appellate court found that Miner adequately presented evidence to
meet the aforementioned requirements of a special use permit for the quarry and
that County was incorrect in finding that the requirements were not met.
Additionally, the court found that County’s reasons for denial were not supported
by material and substantial evidence and that the lower court was incorrect in its
review of the evidence and subsequent affirmation of County’s decision. Therefore,
the court remanded the issue for County to reconsider Miner’s application for a
special use permit for the quarry.

South Dakota
Croell Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Pennington Cty Bd. Of Comm’rs, 2017 S.D. 87, 905
N.W.2d 344.
County Board of Commissioners (“Board”) appealed the circuit court’s decision to
grant Company a construction permit to expand its mining operations into land
controlled by the County Zoning Ordinance (“CZO”). The Supreme Court of South
Dakota reversed the circuit court’s decision to grant the construction permit,
finding that CZO demanded that any extraction of any substance exceeding 100
cubic yards required a mining permit. Furthermore, the statute’s language was so
unambiguous that the city’s interpretation of the CZO was not entitled to any
deference from the court. Finally, even though Company’s operations predated the
CZO, the fact that it sought to expand its operation into areas not previously used
as a quarry demanded the use of a CZO permit.

Washington
Movrich v. Lobermeier, 905 N.W.2d 807 (Wash. 2018).
Property Owners, whose property is located upland from a creek, sued waterbed
property owners (“WB Owners”), asserting a right to access flowage from the
creek and to install a pier directly from Property Owner’s property. The district
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court granted summary judgment for Private Owners and WB Owners appealed to
the Supreme Court of Washington. Three issues were presented in the case: (1)
whether Property Owners have riparian rights, and, when combined with their
rights under the public trust doctrine, those rights become superior to WB Owners’
property rights; (2) whether the public trust doctrine grants WB Owners the right to
install a pier from over the portion that is privately held; and (3) whether the public
trust doctrine requires Property Owners to access the flowage from a public access
point. First, the court held that Property Owners did not hold rights superior to WB
Owners and that Property Owners may enjoy the flowage in ways consistent with
WB Owners’ rights. Second, the court held that “the public trust doctrine conveys
no private property rights, regardless of the presence of navigable water.” Lastly,
the court held that the public trust doctrine allows Property Owners to access the
flowage from their private property so long as they use the flowage in ways
consistent with the doctrine.
Verjee-Van v. Pierce Cty., No. 48947-3-II, 2017 WL 6603662 (Wash. Ct. App.
2017).
Landowner claimed both that Neighbor-1’s pier was improperly constructed and
that Neighbor-2’s fence was improperly placed according to local zoning laws, so
she filed complaints to County to have them removed. County deemed both to be in
accordance with the laws, and Landowner did not appeal its decision. Instead,
Landowner filed a writ of mandamus to force County to remove the complained-of
property features. The trial court found that mandamus was inappropriate and
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the court affirmed and held that mandamus
was inappropriate because Landowner had failed to appeal County’s decision to
administrative authorities and also because Landowner would have had a “plain,
speedy, and adequate” remedy at law if her case was meritorious. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted
before citing the case as precedent.
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS
Traditional Generation
E.D. Kentucky
Kentucky Waterways All. v. Kentucky Utils. Co., No. 5:17-292-DCR, 2017 WL
6628917 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2017).
Environmental Organization sued Utility Company (“Company”) for violating the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”). The CWA claim alleged that Company’s actions in disposing of waste
from its coal-powered generating plant constituted pollution of navigable water
without a permit, and the RCRA claim alleged that Company’s “handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of solid waste” at the station could provide for
“imminent and substantial endangerment” both to human health and to the
environment in the community. Company moved to dismiss Environmental
Organization’s claims. The district court granted Company’s Motion in regards to
the RCRA claim for lack of standing. The court also granted Company’s motion to
dismiss the CWA claims by refusing to adopt any theory that pollution that
groundwaters would eventually flow into navigable waters fell under the reach of
the CWA and its permitting requirement. For those reasons, both claims brought by
Environmental Organization were dismissed. This case has since been appealed,
but there is no decision from the higher court as of publication.

Hawai’i
In re Application of Maui Electric Co., 408 P.3d 1 (Haw. 2017).
Environmental Organization filed a motion to intervene in Utility Company’s
(“Company”) application with Public Utilities Commission (“PUC”) to approve a
power purchase agreement. PUC ultimately denied the motion, and the Supreme
Court of Hawaii granted Environmental Organization’s writ of certiorari, which
presented the issue of whether due process under Hawaii’s Constitution included
protections for individuals “asserting the constitutional right to a clean and
healthful environment.” The court determined that Environmental Organization’s
claim fit within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and allowed
the case to move forward. In order to have a due process claim, Environmental
Organization must have a property interest at stake. The court determined that state
law relating to environmental quality should be interpreted to establish such a right
in Environmental Organization’s interest in a “clean and healthful environment.”
The court further held that because of its due process rights, Environmental
Organization was entitled to a hearing by PUC to evaluate any impacts of
Company’s application on Environmental Organization’s right to a “clean and
healthful environment.” Finally, the court held that Environmental Organization
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had standing. For those reasons, the court held that Environmental Organization
was entitled to a due process hearing by PUC in order to protect its guaranteed
“property right to a clean and healthful environment,” and remanded the case for
further proceedings.

Renewable Generation
Delaware
Exelon Generation Acquisitions, LLC v. Deere & Co., 176 A.3d 1262 (Del. 2017).
Wind farm seller (“Seller”) sued wind farm buyer (“Buyer”), arguing that Buyer
had breached the Purchase Power Agreement. The Purchase Agreement contained
an earn-out provision that could be triggered if Seller reached prescribed goals
related to wind farm projects already under development when the sale occurred.
Following the sale from Seller, Buyer acquired an additional site from an unrelated
party after a nearby site purchased from Seller was blocked due to civic opposition.
Because the site purchased from an unrelated party was financially successful,
Seller argued that the earn-out provision had been triggered by a “Power Purchase
Agreement” on the grounds that Buyer had simply relocated the unsuccessful wind
farm to the new site acquired from the unrelated party. Reversing the lower court’s
summary judgment in favor of Seller, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
earn-out provision had not been triggered because the term “wind project” in
relation to the “Power Purchase Agreement” contained a geographical
characteristic that distinguished the two wind farms in question.

Hawai’i
Hilo Project, LLC v. County of Hawai'i Windward Plan. Comm’n, 409 P.3d 784
(Table) (Haw. Ct. App. 2018).
Adjacent Property Owners appealed the appellate court’s decision to uphold the
approval of Operator's Special Management Area ("SMA") permit to convert a
coal-burning power plant into a renewable electrical power generation facility. The
appellate court held the public trust doctrine as inapplicable because the State of
Hawai’i does not have ownership of the land at issue. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Hawai’i, Property Owners argued that approval of the SMA permit will
have a negative environmental impact and that the public trust doctrine was
misapplied by the appellate court. The Supreme Court of Hawai’i affirmed in part
and remanded in part on the issue of the application of the public trust doctrine.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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Minnesota
In re Order Approving Application by DG Minn. CSG 2, LLC, Case No. A17–
0099, 2017 WL 6567653 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2017).
Landowners appealed County’s decision to grant a conditional use permit (“CUP”)
for a third party to construct a solar farm. The court determined that the County’s
decision would stand unless the entity acted “unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
capriciously.” The court affirmed the decision of County to grant the CUP because
it reasonably interpreted its zoning ordinance to allow for a solar farm to stand as a
conditional use. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.

New Jersey
Minnesota Solar, LLC v. Carver Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, A17–0504, 2017 WL
6418179 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2017).
Producer applied for a conditional use permit (“CUP”) to construct and operate a
large solar farm. County Board of Commissioners (“Board”) denied Producer’s
CUP. Producer appealed, claiming that the Board’s decision was arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable. The court of appeals affirmed Board’s decision for
several reasons. First, Board’s denial of the CUP was legally sufficient for the
stated reasons of “health, safety, and welfare of the community.” Second, the
record supported the reasons for the Board’s denial of the CUP. Third, Producer
could not establish that a violation of its equal protection rights occurred because it
failed to show that “similarly situated persons have been treated differently.” This
is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.

North Carolina
Ecoplexus Inc. v. Cty. of Currituck, 809 S.E.2d 148 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
Developer applied for a permit to use property owned by City to build a solar farm.
After finding that Developer’s proposed solar farm would be dangerous to public
safety or health, would not “be in harmony with the surrounding area,” and would
fail to conform to the 2006 Land Use Plan, the county board of commissioners
(“Board”) denied Developer’s application. Developer appealed Board’s decision to
the trial court, which upheld the order. The appellate court held that the denial of
Developer’s permit was inappropriate because Developer was able to make a prima
facie showing that it was entitled to the permit, and opponents to the permit did not
present evidence sufficient to overcome that showing. The court held that Board
“relied on generalized lay concerns, speculation, and ‘mere expression of opinion’”
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to deny Developer’s application rather than requiring the level of evidence needed
to rebut Developer’s prima facie showing that it was entitled to the permit. The
court therefore reversed the Board’s denial and remanded the issue.

Transmission
D.C. Circuit
Ameren Servs. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 880 F.3d 571 (D.C. Cir.
2018).
Transmission Company brought this suit against Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) after FERC issued orders allowing incoming Midcontinent
Independent System Operator (“MISO”) generators to bring in new sources of
power, connect them to the existing grid, and self-fund the new construction
regardless of current grid owners’ interests. Transmission Company argued that
involuntary generator funding would force it to have to construct and operate its
facilities without any returns, as if it was a non-profit manager of the facilities. It
would have to take on costs that it would never recoup. FERC argued that it would
be unjust and discriminatory to deprive an interconnection customer of the ability
to self-fund. The court remanded the case based on this issue, holding that FERC
failed to fully consider Transmission Company’s arguments and that its potentialdiscrimination argument against interconnection customers was weak.

Arizona
Else v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, No. 1 CA-CV 17-0208, 2018 WL 542924 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2018).
Landowner sued the Arizona Corporation Commission (“Commission”) in regard
to its approval of Operator’s proposed transmission line project. Landowner
contended that, while Operator argued the project would “create[ ] access to
stranded renewable [energy] resources,” the actual project could be substantially
different from Operator’s proposed project. Additionally, Landowner argues that
there was insufficient evidence for the Commission to grant approval of the project.
Because Landowner failed to meet the burden of proof in demonstrating that the
Commission’s grant was either “unreasonable or unlawful,” the appellate court
upheld the lower court’s affirmation of the grant of a Certificate of Environmental
Compatibility by Commission.
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South Dakota
Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Parkshill Farms, LLC, 2017 SD 88, 905 N.W.2d
334.
Utilities Company (“Company”) sought to construct transmission line across
several miles of land. After unsuccessful negotiations with Landowners to obtain
easements, Company filed petition for condemnation. The trial court granted the
petition, and a jury awarded Landowners just compensation for the easements.
Landowners appealed based on three issues: (1) the easements were not taken for
public use; (2) the easements were not necessary; and (3) the trial court erred in
refusing Landowner’s requested jury instruction for compensation of damages. The
Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the easements were for public use
because Company is required by law to provide service to the general public.
Additionally, the court held that the easements were necessary and Company did
not abuse its discretion because the easements’ uses were limited in purpose,
instead of for all uses. Finally, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial
because the jury instructions did not adequately account for other rights acquired
by the easements, even though they might never be used.

Rates
California
California Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 879 F.3d 966
(9th Cir. 2018).
Public Utilities Commission petitioned for a determination on the validity of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) finding that Gas and Electric
Company (“Company”) was eligible for an “incentive adder.” The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that FERC’s determination that Company was eligible for an
incentive adder was arbitrary and capricious because FERC determined that
Company was eligible due to its membership in a regional transmission
organization, even though such membership was mandated by state law. Therefore,
FERC’s interpretation of Order 679, which was created to incentivize utility
companies to join regional transmission organizations, was plainly erroneous. The
court reasoned that the language of Order 679 implied that “an incentive cannot
‘induce’ behavior that is already legally mandated.” Moreover, the language of the
Order suggested that ongoing membership in a regional transmission organization
was not sufficient alone to justify eligibility for an incentive adder. Without a more
reasoned explanation by FERC, Company was not entitled to an incentive adder.
Thus, the court granted Commission’s petition for review and remanded back to
FERC.
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS
Bankruptcy
W.D. Texas
In re Primera Energy, LLC, 579 B.R. 75 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2017).
Investors brought action against debtor Oil and Gas Companies (“Companies”),
asserting claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Companies, in response,
contend that Investors failed to adequately asserted a cause of action, and
moreover, no fiduciary relationship between the parties existed, nor did Companies
partake in any instances of fraudulent behavior. Based on the evidence presented,
the Bankruptcy Court held that under Texas state law, Investors’ fraud claims were
not precluded based on oral representations, members could be held individually
liable for fraudulent acts of debtor Companies, and Companies’ representations that
they would use Investor’s funds as provided in relevant contracts was material in
support of claims of fraud. Further, because the transaction involved real property
interests, the first element for a cause of action for statutory fraud in a real estate
transaction was satisfied. Moreover, Investors’ negligent misrepresentation claims
were supported by showing that Companies did not exercise reasonable care when
obtaining and communicating false information. Additionally, evidence showed
that the transfer of investment funds was done with intent to hinder, delay, and
defraud investors. Thus, Investors were entitled actual damages of the value of their
investments.

Other Issues
Fifth Circuit
WBH Energy, L.P. v. CL III Funding Holding, Co., 708 F. App’x 210 (Mem) (5th
Cir. Jan. 10 2018).
In September 2011, a Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”) was formed between the
Corporation, Debtor Company-1, and Debtor Company-2. The JOA stipulated that
in the event of any legal proceeding between any of the parties, the prevailing party
would be entitled to all reasonable attorneys’ fees from the opposing party. Based
on four previous legal actions, Corporation claimed entitlement to attorneys’ fees
thereunder. However, the lower court found that all of these proceedings were
brought seeking temporary injunctive relief and not to enforce a “financial
obligation” as required by the language of the JOA, thus denying the attorney’s
fees. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and affirmed.
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D. Kansas
Energy Intelligence Grp., Inc. v. CHS McPherson Ref., Inc., No. 16-01015-EFMGLR, 2018 WL 447730 (D. Kan. Jan. 1, 2018).
Company-1 published newsletters and distributed them to subscribers. Company-1
tried registering Oil Daily with the United States Copyright Office for twelve years.
Company-2 was a subscriber to Oil Daily for over twenty years and Petroleum
Intelligence Weekly for over thirty; it would receive the publications in print and
then distribute them to executives throughout the office. Once Company-1 went
digital with its publications, Company-2 continued to distribute them via email.
Company-1 sued Company-2 for infringing the copyrights of its publications, and
Company-2 denied the infringement and filed a motion to refer the matter to the
Register of Copyrights, arguing that Company-1’s copyright registrations were not
valid because it allegedly made known misrepresentations to the United States
Copyright Office when registering for the Oil Daily publications. The court denied
Company-2’s motion, concluding that Company-1 did not provide inaccurate
information to the United States Copyright Office when it went to register Oil
Daily. The court noted that even if it assumed inaccurate information was provided,
it was not fraudulent because Company-1 did not do so intentionally.

Delaware
City of Birmingham Ret.& Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47 (Del. 2017).
Several Environmental Groups brought an action against Corporation, an energy
company based in North Carolina, under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) for the
release of coal and ash into the lakes in North Carolina. CWA says that without a
permit by the EPA, discharge of pollution is unlawful. The North Carolina
environmental group and Corporation negotiated a consent decree where
Corporation would pay a fine and complete a compliance schedule. Corporation
never completed an investigation of the pipe. Some investigation indicated that if
Corporation had conducted an inspection of the pipe, it would have detected the
corroded pipe. The Stockholders of Corporation filed a suit after a storm water pipe
ruptured. The rupture caused coal and ash to go into the River. Corporation plead
guilty to several criminal misdemeanor violations. Some Stockholders of the
Corporation filed a suit against the directors and officers. The directors moved for
dismissal of the claim alleging that the Stockholders were required to make a
demand on the board of directors before pursuing litigation. The trial court agreed
with the Directors that in order for the Stockholders to hold the directors personally
liable for a Caremark violation they first needed to show the directors intentionally
breached their fiduciary duty and -rose to the occasion of bad faith. The Supreme
Court of Delaware upheld the trial court’s decision and found that the stockholders
were required to first make a demand to the directors before pursuing litigation.
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North Carolina
Continental Res., Inc. v. P&P Indus., LLC I, 2018 ND 11, 906 N.W.2d 1.
Producer sued Service Provider for breach of contract, tortious interference, and
fraud and deceit, claiming that Service Provider improperly billed Producer for
transportation and water hauling services. Service Provider counterclaimed,
seeking damages for breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and promissory estoppel. The trial court granted
summary judgment on Service Provider’s breach of fiduciary duty and constructive
fraud counterclaims. A jury found for Producer on its claims of fraud and deceit
and found in favor of Service Provider on its claims of fraud, deceit, and breach of
contract. However, while the court ordered damages to be paid to Producer on its
prevailing claims, it provided neither damages nor relief for Service Provider, and
excused Producer from performing the breached contract. Service Provider
motioned the court to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial,
but both motions were denied. Service Provider appealed, claiming that the lower
court erred when it denied its motions arguing that it is entitled to recover damages
for the value of materials and services it provided in the contract breached by
Producer as well as the value of its destroyed business. The Supreme Court of
North Dakota reversed the trial court and remanded the case, holding that the jury’s
finding that Producer was excused from performing the contract it breached due to
Service Provider’s prior material breach was inconsistent and perverse and could
not be reconciled by law, and Service Provider was only entitled to the net profits it
would have lost during the thirty-day notice period of contract terminations.

Ohio
Kinnear Rd. Redevelopment, L.L.C. v. Testa, 151 Ohio St.3d 540, 2017-Ohio-8816,
90 N.E.3d 926.
Tax Commissioner (“Commissioner”) challenged the Board of Tax Appeals’
(“Board”) finding that Developer was entitled to a tax exemption under state law.
The exemption, also known as the “brownfield exemption,” was created for
developers who remediated a hazardous-waste contaminated property and provided
a tax break for the developers based upon the increase in market value of the
property upon remediation. Developer remediated a vacant and contaminated
property and constructed an apartment building on the land. Commissioner granted
an exemption for the increase in property value based upon the remediated land but
did not provide an exemption for the increase in property value due to the newly
constructed apartment building as Commissioner felt it was not covered under the
statute. Board disagreed with Commissioner and found that Developer should have
been granted an exemption based on both the remediation and the improvements.
Based on the plain language of the statute, the court agreed with Board’s
conclusion that the exemption applies to the land and improvements. The court also
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concluded that Commissioner’s argument that the timing of the construction of the
improvements and the time of the tax assessment prevented the improvements
exemption had no merit.
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
Federal
9th Circuit
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2017).
Miners challenged the Department of the Interior’s (“DOI”) decision to temporarily
withdraw, under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“Act”), over onemillion acres of federal land around the Grand Canyon from any new uranium
mining claims for the maximum period allowed – twenty years – in order to protect
the land from potential uranium contamination in the surrounding environment and
groundwater. The Act imposed on DOI a twenty-year limitation on withdrawals,
issuance of a report to Congress detailing the statutory requirement, and the
possibility that Congress may veto DOI’s withdrawal; the Act also contained a
severability clause. The district court upheld DOI’s decision to withdraw the lands.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the congressional veto
provision was unconstitutional, but because of the severability clause it did not
affect DOI’s ability to withdraw federal lands. Regarding Miners’ challenge to
DOI’s compliance with the Act’s multiple-use requirement, which required DOI to
weigh economic benefits of the land with the preservation of the land, the court
concluded that DOI complied. Regarding whether current laws and regulations
would adequately protected the land in question, the court found that DOI correctly
concluded that existing laws were inadequate. The court dismissed Miners’
remaining claims. This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from
the higher court as of publication.
Protecting Ariz.’s Res. & Children v. Fed. Highway Admin., No. 16-16586, No. 1616605, 2017 WL 6146939 (9th Cir. Dec. 08, 2017).
District court granted Federal Highway Administration’s (“FHA”) motion for
summary judgment regarding Advocacy Group’s contention that the approval of a
section of freeway violated the National Environmental Policy Act and the
Department of Transportation Act (collectively “Acts”), which Advocacy Groups
subsequently appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that FHA
adequately specified its purpose and need for the proposed freeway and provided
reasonable alternatives. Moreover, FHA adequately discussed hazardous spill
probabilities and potential mitigation strategies as well as the proposed freeway’s
potential impact on children’s health and groundwater wells. Thus, FHA’s
Environmental Impact Statement was sufficiently compliant with the Acts. The
Ninth Circuit accordingly affirmed the findings of the district court. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted
before citing the case as precedent
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D.C. Circuit
Friends of Capital Crescent Trail v. Fed. Transit Admin., 877 F.3d 1051, (D.C. Cir
2017).
Activists challenged Agency’s approval of a new rail project, asserting that there
are problems with another rail service within the city and those problems impacted
the analysis. State maintained that the systems are largely separate and do not
significantly impact one another. The lower court found that the systems do impact
one another, agreeing that if there is a “diminished ridership,” then there is an
impact on the new light rail system, since many existing users would transition
over to or take advantage of the new system. The lower court required further
evaluation and retracted the Record of Decision but allowed Agency to
independently evaluate the required depth of further analysis based on their
examination of the new and existing rail systems. Agency claimed that the project
would function as expected for its intended purpose under any anticipated scenario
and would cause no negative impacts other than the impacts reported on the first
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”), so they did not think a formal
supplemental environmental impact statement was necessary. The district court
disagreed, and still required a supplemental EIS because Agency did not adequately
address concerns about the project and did not show evidence to support their
determination that new system would work as intended in every scenario. The
appeals court disagreed with the lower court, finding that Agency was not required
to explicitly address Tribe’s every concern. Instead, the appeal court held that
Agency should receive deference because they explained the reasoning behind their
decision not to do a EIS, which relied upon their specific, specialized knowledge
and experience. The appeals court likewise affirmed the district court’s
determination that Activist’s challenges to the original EIS, specifically the
evaluation of alternatives, were unfounded.
Natural Res. Defense Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 879 F.3d 1202
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
The Natural Resources Defense Council and the Powder River Basin Resource
Council ("Councils") sued the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("Commission"), seeking a review of Operator's license to conduct in situ leach
(“ISL”) uranium mining. Councils contended procedural and substantive errors by
Commission in approving Operator's license and raised several issues before the
court. Because of the proximity between potential aquifers and the layers of
uranium-bearing sandstone, Commission requires production applicants to consider
the environmental impact and plans for groundwater restoration of proposed
projects. Along with procedural claims, Councils argued that Operator will
“inevitably” be required to restore the groundwater associated with the mined
aquifer, which Councils claimed was unconsidered by Commission during the
license’s application phase. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
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upheld Commission's decisions during Operator's licensing approval process
because Commission was not obligated to address Council's contention that
operator had additional expansion plans.

N.D. Alaska
Abner v. United States Pipe & Foundry, Co., 2:15-cv-02040-KOB, 2018 WL
522771 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2018).
After the EPA discovered contamination on their properties, Landowners filed both
tort and property damage claims against Company based upon the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).
Company filed a motion for summary judgment on most of Landowners’ claims
based upon failure to state a claim as well as being barred by the state’s statute of
limitations. The trial court found for Landowners and ruled that they did not need
to allege that they bore costs of remediating the contamination of their properties
for a CERCLA claim, but only needed to show that the EPA had expended costs.
The court also ruled that, since CERCLA applied, the statute of limitations did not
accrue until the CERCLA action was commenced by the government. This case has
since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher court as of
publication.

N.D. Indiana
Valbruna Slater Steel Corp. v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., No. 1:10-CV-044 JD, 2018 WL
446645 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 16, 2018).
Corporations filed a contribution action under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) against Manufacturers to
help pay for pollution that they were responsible for on Corporations’ property.
The trial court found that Manufacturers were entirely liable for the costs of the
cleanup. The appellate court reapportioned the costs to twenty-five percent to
Corporations and seventy-five percent to Manufacturers because, despite
Manufacturers and other third parties being entirely at fault for the contamination,
Corporations bought the property at a reduced price due to the contamination and
were aware of it prior to purchase.

W.D. Virginia
Red River Coal Co. v. Sierra Club, No. 2:17CV00021, 2018 WL 491668 (W.D.
Va. Jan. 19, 2018).
Organizations brought a collective citizen suit against a Coal Company.
Organizations alleged that the Coal Company violated the federal Clean Water Act
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(“CWA”) and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”). Coal
Company filed a Motion to Dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and sought declaratory judgment. Organizations argue that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment. Each party moved to
dismiss the others claims. The district court found that it did have federal subject
matter jurisdiction because the Organizations’ claim arouse under the CWA.
Organizations claim that Coal Company is discharging pollutants without permit
authorization under the CWA. These discharges result in elevated levels of total
dissolved solid and conductivity in the streams into which the underdrains
discharge. Organizations also claim that Coal Company is required to comply with
Virginia SMCRA under its SMCRA permit. A Virginia state regulation requires
that waters must be free from substances or waste that are “inimical or harmful to
human, animal, plant, or aquatic life.” The district court found that there is a
genuine issue of fact regarding whether the CWA controls underdrains and are
therefore subject to the CWA’s permit requirement. Therefore, because the court
did have subject matter jurisdiction and there was a claim, the court dismissed the
Coal Company’s motions to dismiss.

State
California
Central Coast Forest Ass'n v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2018).
Companies harvested timber from lands in an area where coho salmon spawn.
Companies petitioned the Fish and Game Commission (“Commission”) to delist
the coho salmon south of San Francisco from the endangered species register in
California. For a species to be considered endangered in an area, it must be wild
and native to that area. Companies argued that coho salmon were never native to
the streams south of San Francisco; instead, Companies argued that the fish only
existed within these streams because of hatchery plants or artificial placement.
Commission denied Companies’ assertions that the coho salmon were not native to
the streams, and subsequently denied the petition to delist them as an endangered
species in this area. Commission relied on evidence dating back to the time when
the coho salmon were listed. Companies appealed. The Supreme Court of
California held that the California Endangered Species Act (“the Act”) permitted
Companies to bring a petition for the delisting of a species using new evidence and
reversed and remanded the issue. On remand, the appellate concluded, however,
that the evidence presented by Companies did not meet the necessary threshold for
a delisting. The court held that the petition did not contain sufficient scientific
evidence, considered in light of the department’s scientific report and expertise, to
justify delisting the coho salmon south of San Francisco, and, therefore, there was
no sufficient evidence that the delisting might have been warranted.
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City of Long Beach v. City of Los Angeles, A148993, 2018 WL 387934 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 1, 2018).
Group, comprised of individuals and government officials, filed a suit seeking to
set aside the Final Environmental Impact Report (“FEIR”) allowing the
construction of a new railyard a few miles from the Port of Los Angeles. The trial
court found that the FEIR was deficient because it failed to address the impact of
the project on the growth. The trial court also found that the FEIR was inadequate
on the impact of the project on the noise, air pollution, and air quality. The circuit
court of appeals noted that the FEIR was not misleading about the project and
noted that the operation of the project would have a significant impact on the air
quality due to the air pollution. The appeals court also noted that the FEIR
adequately met the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act.
City of Modesto v. Dow Che. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 764 (Cal Ct. App. 2018).
City sued dry cleaning businesses (“Business”), alleging that Businesses had caused
damage to City’s groundwater. City sought damages for past, present, and future
costs of the contamination’s cleanup under the Polanco Redevelopment Act
(“Polanco”), which authorizes redevelopment agencies to remediate contamination
found at property within the agency’s jurisdiction. The appellate court vacated the
trial court’s ruling, holding that the causation standard should be whether it is more
likely than not that Businesses were a substantial factor in creating the
contamination. Under Polanco, liability could be proven through circumstantial
evidence if sufficient to lead a reasonable finder of fact to find that a defendant’s
activity was a contributing factor to the contamination. This opinion of the court is
certified for partial publication; therefore, state court rules should be consulted
before citing the case as precedent.

Louisiana
Adams v. Grefer, 17-250 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/13/17), 234 So.3d 201.
Residents alleged that Oil and Gas Corporations (“Corporations”) operations
exposed them to naturally occurring radioactive material. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Corporations and fifty-six Residents appealed. On
appeal, the appellate court held that Corporations had met their burden of proof that
their actions did not cause harm to Residents. Under Louisiana law, Residents must
provide evidence that Corporations “substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries.” Under the facts of the case, Corporations met this burden by
providing affidavits from an expert health physicist in support of their motions,
shifting the burden to Residents to show that a genuine issue of fact existed, which
they were unable to do. The appellate court accordingly affirmed the trial court
decision.
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Montana
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 2017 MT 324, 390
Mont. 76, 408 P.3d 515.
Mining Company appealed the trial court’s order that required Mining Company to
pay Property Owners restorative damages under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). The court considered
three issues: (1) whether Property Owners’ claim complied with CERCLA’s timing
of review provision; (2) whether Property Owners were “potentially responsible
parties,” meaning that their restoration activities required EPA approval; and (3)
whether Property Owners’ claim was preempted because it conflicted with
CERCLA. As to the first issue, the court determined that Property Owners’ claim
complied with CERCLA’s timing of review provision because the claim did not
qualify as a challenge to the CERCLA mandated cleanup. As to the second issue,
the court determined that Property Owners were not potentially responsible parties
because they did not fall into any of the three recognized categories of responsible
parties. The court reasoned that the designation as a potentially responsible party
can occur through three ways: (1) when the party voluntarily settles with the EPA;
(2) when a court makes a determination that an actor is a responsible party; and (3)
when a party is a defendant in a CERCLA lawsuit. As to the third issue, the court
determined that there was no express nor implied preemption of Property Owners’
claim by CERCLA.

New Jersey
Raritan Baykeeper, Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Nos. A–3485–13T1, A–5407–
13T1, 2017 WL 6546973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 20, 2017).
Property Owner applied to Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) for a
permit and exception to begin a “remedial action work plan.” DEP granted the
application and a related Company’s application for a Class B Recycling Center
permit to produce alternative fill for use in the plan on Property Owner’s property.
Environmental Conservation Group appealed DEP’s approval of both applications
based upon several arguments. The court of appeals, rejecting many of the
arguments and finding others lacked merit, affirmed the DEP’s approval of both
applications. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Yadav v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.-Land Use Regulation, No. A–4035–15T2, 2017
WL 6398931 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2017).
Property Owner appealed the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection’s (“DEP”) decision to cancel Property Owner’s application for a letter of
interpretation authenticating the position of wetlands, transition areas, and State
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open waters on their land. The court stated that Property Owner had the burden of
showing that the DEP’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.” The
court determined that Property Owner did not meet this burden of proof, because
the record evidenced that Property Owner had failed to comply with DEP’s
reasonable requests for modifications to their application. This is an unpublished
opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing
the case as precedent.

New Mexico
Cmtys. for Clean Water v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm’n., NO. A-1CA-35253, 2017 WL 6884309 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2017).
Clean water advocates (“Advocates”) sued State Water Quality Control
Commission (“Commission”) after Advocates’ request for a public hearing was
denied by State Environment Department (“Department”). Advocates request for a
public hearing was in relation to a Department of Energy water discharge permit
application. After the request was denied by Department on the grounds that the
permit had “already contemplated community involvement and was in the public
interest,” Commission upheld the denial by a nine-to-two vote. Because governing
state law provides that Commission can deny a request for public hearing only
when there is no substantial public interest, Advocates argued that Commission
exceeded its discretionary authority by denying the request for public hearing.
Commission argued that its denial complied with state law and that the relevant
regulation’s language requiring an “opportunity for a public hearing” does not
necessarily require a public hearing. Noting the relevant state law’s plain language
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s holdings on comparable language, the appellate
court held that the state legislature had meant to empower the Department with
only “limited discretion” in making public hearing determinations. Because the
appellate court found that the factors cited by Commission in upholding the denial
were not supported by substantial evidence, the court ultimately reversed
Commission’s upholding of the denial of Advocates request for public hearing.

New York
In re Friends of P.S. 163, Inc. v. Jewish Home Lifecare, 90 N.E.3d 1253 (N.Y.
2017).
Operator applied to the Department of Health (“DOH”) for consent to construct a
new nursing home on a vacant lot in New York City located next to Organization’s
school. Operator filed an Environmental Assessment Statement (“EAS”) which
triggered the State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”) review process.
The review found that the project posed a potential risk of exposure to lead and
lead dust. The review also analyzed the potential impact of construction noise to
the surrounding area. DOH concluded that the potential impact of lead and lead

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

1570

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

dust were mitigated and would not pose a risk because the excavated dirt would be
removed from the site and the monitoring and containment measures in place to
combat the dust, including tarps and sprinklers, were sufficient to prevent the dust
from getting into the public airways. After public hearings, DOH imposed
additional procedures on Operator, which included installing noise-reducing
windows to Organization’s school, installing window air conditioners to the
classrooms lacking them, and erecting a 16-foot sound barrier wall. Organization
sought to vacate the determination by DOH arguing it did not adequately address
the environmental concerns, particularly the use of a tent over the construction site
and the installation of central air conditioning for Organization’s school.
Organization argued that the standards that DOH used to evaluate the lead and dust
were outdated. The court held that DOH used accepted federal and state standards
when it evaluated the site. The court also held that DOH acted within is authority
when choosing between alternatives to mitigate the dangers. The fact that
Organization preferred different actions did not mean DOH did not make the
required “hard look” at the concerns.

Pennsylvania
United Envtl. Grp., Inc. v. GKK McKnight, LP, 176 A.3d 946 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017).
The gas station’s Previous Owner sold the property to Purchaser. Previous Owner
asked Environmental Company to perform environmental remediation services,
including removing tanks. Environmental Company submitted a quote for its work
and Previous Owner accepted and entered into a contract for the services.
Environmental Company immediately began work and discovered contaminated
soil on the land. Environmental Company immediately notified Previous Owner
and Purchaser, as well as the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection and Pennsylvania’s Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund,
which reimburses individuals for remediation costs. Environmental Company
informed Previous Owner and Purchaser that due to this discovery, more work
would have to be done, which the parties agreed to. After remediation was
complete, Previous Owner and Purchaser failed to pay the full balance of their
invoices due to Environmental Company, and Environmental Company sued for
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, continuing services, and damages under the
Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (“Act”). At trial, a jury found for
Environmental Company; however. Environmental Company appealed the verdict
because it was not granted relief for its claim under the Act. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the trial court erred when it held that Environmental
Company’s claims under the Act were foreclosed as a matter of law because the
claims were never tried before any factfinder. However, the court held that the trial
court properly declined Purchaser’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict because there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the parties
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agreed to alter the contract. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed in part
and reversed in part.

Washington
Douglass v. Shamrock Paving, Inc., 406 P.3d 1155 (Wash. 2017).
Paving Company (“Company”) used Landowner’s land for storing, cleaning, and
fueling its machines while carrying out a paving project. During that time,
Company spilled unknown amounts of heavy lube oil on the property causing
damage to the soil. Landowners engaged an environmental consulting firm to
investigate the contamination and to perform cleanup, which consisted of removing
sixty-eight tons of soil. Landowners sued Company for trespass and nuisance and
also asserted a claim under the Model Toxics Control Act for cleanup costs.
Landowners prevailed on the trespass and nuisance claims, but the court denied
cleanup costs on the grounds that Landowners failed to prove that the substance
was an environmental threat. On appeal, the court reversed the lower court’s
decision, finding Landowner did conduct remedial action when Landowners tested
the soil. However, the court deferred to the trial court’s findings that Landowners
could not recover for cleanup costs because the lube oil was not a hazardous
substance. Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington, and the
court held that the costs of soil testing could be recovered as remedial costs, but not
the costs incurred in cleaning up the spill.
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